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Young: Criminal Law - Death Penalty: Jury Discretion Bridled

CRIMINAL LAW-DEATH PENALTY: JURY DISCRETION
BRIDLED-State v.Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 474 (1982).
INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Amendment,1 applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment,2 assures that the State's power to punish
be "exercised within the limits of civilized standards."-, Although
imposition of the death penalty does not per se constitute cruel
and unusual punishment,' the Eighth Amendment does forbid its
imposition in the unbridled discretion of the jury, 5 or as
mandatory upon conviction for a specific offense, such as first degree murder."
The Eighth Amendment requires that the jury be given discretion in capital cases, but this discretion must be guided with objective standards. 7 North Carolina's attempt to conform to this constitutional standard is found in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-2000 to
2003,8 effective June 1, 1977.
1. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

2. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (state statute making
it criminal offense to be "addicted to narcotics" violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
3. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
4. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285 (1976). Justice Marshall has
consistently argued that the death penalty per se constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting opinion).
5. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 304 (1976).
7. Id.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 and 2002 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provide in pertinent part:
§ 15A-2000. Sentence of death or life imprisonment for capitalfelonies; further proceedings to determine sentence.(a) Separate Proceedings on Issue of Penalty.(1) Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of
a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing
proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment. A capital felony is
one which may be punishable by death.
(b) Sentence Recommendation by the Jury.-Instructions deter-
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mined by the trial judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be
given by the court in its charge to the jury prior to its deliberation
in determining sentence. In all cases in which the death penalty
may be authorized, the judge shall include in his instructions to the
jury that it must consider any aggravating circumstance or circumstances or mitigating circumstance or circumstances from the lists
provided in subsections (e) and (f) which may be supported by the
evidence, and shall furnish to the jury a written list of issues relating to such aggravating or mitigating circumstance or
circumstances.
After hearing the evidence, arguments of counsel, and instructions of the court, the jury shall deliberate and render a sentence
recommendation to the court, based upon the following matters:
(1) Whether any sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances are enumerated in subsection (e) exist;
(2) Whether any sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances as enumerated in subsection (f), which outweigh
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found, exist;
and
(3) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or to imprisonment in the
State's prison for life.
(c) Findings in Support of Sentence of Death.-When the jury recommends a sentence of death, the foreman of the jury shall sign a
writing on behalf of the jury which writing shall show:
(1) The statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances
which the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) That the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances found by the jury are sufficiently substantial to call
for the imposition of the death penalty; and
(3) That the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.
(d) Review and Judgement of Sentence.(1) The judgement of conviction and sentence of death shall
be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina pursuant to procedures established by the
Rules of Appellate Procedure. In its review, the Supreme
Court shall consider the punishment imposed as well as any
errors assigned on appeal.
(2) The sentence of death shall be overturned and a sentence
of life imprisonment imposed in lieu thereof by the Supreme
Court upon a finding that the record does not support the
jury's findings of any aggravating circumstance or circumstances upon which the sentencing court based its sentence of
death, or upon a finding that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor or upon a finding that the sentence of death
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G.S. 15A-2000 prevents a jury from recommending 9 a sentence
of death unless it has answered three crucial issues, involving the
presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors, affirmatively beyond a reasonable doubt.' 0 In State v. Pinch," the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that it is proper to instruct the jury
that it has a duty to recommend the death penalty if it answers
these issues affirmatively. 2 This holding is inconsistent with the
interpretation given G.S. § 15A-2000 by numerous trial courts, that
have construed the statute to mean that if these issues were anis excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
The Supreme Court may suspend consideration of death penalty cases until such time as the court determines it is prepared to make comparisons required under the provisions of
this section.
(3) If the sentence of death and the judgement of the trial
court are reversed on appeal for error in the post-verdict sentencing proceeding, the Supreme Court shall order that a new
sentencing hearing be conducted in conformity with the procedures of this Article.
§ 15A-2002. Capital offenses; jury verdict and sentence.-If the recommendation of the jury is that the defendant be sentenced to death, the judge shall
impose a sentence of death in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 15, Article 19 of the General Statutes. If the recommendation of the jury is that the defendant be imprisoned for life in the State's prison, the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life in the State's prison.
9. "Recommending" is misleading because the trial judge is bound by the
recommendation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2002 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c) (Cure. Supp. 1981).
11. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203 cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 474 (1982).
12. Id. at 34, 292 S.E.2d at 227. The North Carolina Surpeme Court reaffirmed this holding in two other capital cases decided with Pinch. See State v.
Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 688-690, 292 S.E.2d 243, 262-263, cert. denied, 103 S.Ct.
474 (1982) and State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 707-710, 292 S.E.2d 264, 274-276,
cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 474 (1982). In each case, Justice Exum dissented as to
sentence for the reasons stated in Pinch. See 305 N.C. at 691, 292 S.E.2d at 264,
and 305 N.C. at 712, 292 S.E.2d at 277.
Recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court declined to reconsider its holdings in Pinch, Williams, and Smith with respect to this issue. See State v. McDougal, No. 86A81, slip op. at 34-35 (N.C. April 5, 1983). Justice Exum again
dissented as to sentence for the reasons stated in Pinch, saying "I continue to
think that a jury never has a duty to recommend death no matter how it answers
the issue." No. 86A81, slip op. at 10 (N.C. April 5, 1983) (Exum, J. dissenting as
to sentence).
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swered affirmatively, the jury could, but was not required, to rec13
ommend the death penalty.
THE CASE

On October 17, 1979, defendant, a nineteen year old male, shot
and killed two men at a motorcycle clubhouse in Greensboro.14 The
defendant was subsequently arrested in California, and during the
flight back to North Carolina made a full confession to the
murders. 15 Upon defendant's motion, the cases were joined for
trial. At the trial stage of North Carolina's bifurcated procedure in
capital cases, 6 the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts.
At the penalty stage, both the prosecutor and the trial judge
advised the jury that it had a duty to recommend a sentence of
death if it found three things: (1) that one or more statutory aggravating circumstances existed; (2) that the aggravating circumstances were substantial enough to warrant the death penalty; and
(3) that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.' 7 The jury was also advised that it had a duty to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment if it did not find any one of those three things.'
The jury recommended the sentence of death in both cases,
and the trial judge imposed the death penalty. The convictions and
death sentences were subject to automatic review by the North
Carolina Supreme Court.' 9
Among numerous assignments of error on appeal, defendant
contended that the foregoing instructions were improper, on the
basis that they "prejudicially withdrew from the jury its final option . . .to recommend a life sentence notwithstanding its earlier
findings." 20 The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this contention and upheld the challenged instructions. The convictions
and sentences of death were affirmed.
13. Id. at 42, 292 S.E.2d at 232 (Exum, J., dissenting); see e.g., State v.
Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 275 S.E.2d 450 (1981) (Record at 192) ("you may recommend death").
14. 306 N.C. at 6, 292 S.E.2d at 211.
15. Id. at 6-7, 292 S.E.2d at 212.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
17. 306 N.C. at 32-33, 292 S.E.2d at 226-227.
18. Id. at 33, 292 S.E.2d at 227.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
20. 306 N.C. at 33, 292 S.E.2d at 227 (citing Defendant's Brief at 75).
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BACKGROUND

When the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, the States
uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death
mandatory for certain crimes.21 The States gradually limited the
classes of capital offenses, but it was not until 1838 that a state
first granted juries sentencing discretion in capital cases.22 By the
turn of the century, 23 states and the Federal Government had
made death sentences discretionary for first degree murder and
other offenses.2 3 All remaining jurisdictions replaced their
mandatory death statutes with discretionary jury sentencing by
1963.4
Before 1949, North Carolina imposed a mandatory death sentence on any person convicted of rape or first degree murder.25 In
that year the General Assembly modified the rape and murder
statutes, and granted juries the discretion to recommend life
sentences in all capital cases.2
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court decided Furman v.
Georgia.7 In Furman, three Negro defendants, each convicted of
21. 428 U.S. at 289 (Woodson contains an excellent brief history of
mandatory death penalty statutes in the United States at 289-293).
22. Id. at 291. Tennessee in 1838, followed by Alabama in 1841 and Louisiana
in 1846, were the first states to abandon mandatory death sentences in favor of
discretionary death penalty statutes.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 299.
26. Id. at 299-300. This modification was proposed by a study commission
created by the General Assembly. The study commission noted that only three
other states still retain mandatory death penalty statutes, and that frequently
juries refused to convict under such laws because they believed the defendant,
although guilty, should not suffer death. Id. (citing Report of the Special Commission For the Improvement of the Administration of Justice, North Carolina, Popular Government 13 (Jan. 1949).
27. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). (Douglas, J. concurring stated that it is
cruel and unusual punishment to apply the death penalty selectively to minorities, and that because of the discriminatory application of the statutes they were
unconstitutional in their application. Brennan, J. concurring stated that punishment was cruel and unusual if it did not comport with human dignity, and that it
was a denial of human dignity for a state arbitrarily to subject a person to an
unusually severe punishment which society did not regard as acceptable. Stewart,
J. concurring, stated that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the
death penalty to be "wantonly and freakishly" imposed on a "capriciously se-,
lected random handful." White, J. concurring, stated that as administered, the
death penalty was so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution was too
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rape or murder, were sentenced to death under a Georgia statute
which gave juries discretion whether to impose the death penalty,
but provided no standards as to how this discretion was to be exercised. In a per curiam opinion expressing the views of five members of the Court, it was held that the imposition of the death penalty in these circumstances constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court considered the effect of
Furman on the North Carolina criminal statutes the following year
in State v. Waddell.29 In that case, the court held unconstitutional
the provision of the rape statute that gave the jury the option of
returning a verdict of guilty without capital punishment, but held
further that this provision was severable so that the statute survived as a mandatory death penalty law.30 The court suggested
that the General Assembly delete the provision from its criminal
statutes, and held that in the interim trial judges were not to instruct juries that they had discretion to recommend life imprisonment.3 The General Assembly subsequently amended the statutes
32
to eliminate the dispensing power of the jury in capital cases.
The constitutionality of North Carolina's mandatory death
penalty laws was challenged in Woodson v. North Carolina,3" one
of a quintet 4 of death penalty cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court on July 2, 1976. The Court held that North Caroattenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice. Marshall, J. concurring,
stated that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment because it was an
excessive and unnecessary punishment and because it was morally unacceptable
to the people of the United States.)
28. Id.
29. 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973).
30. Id. at 444-45, 194 S.E.2d at 28. (The court cited Bank v. Lacy, 188 N.C.
25, 123 S.E. 475 (1924) which said "The invalidity of one part of a statute does
not nullify the remainder when the parts are separable, and the invalid part was
not the consideration or inducement for the Legislature to enact the part that is
valid.")
31. 282 N.C. at 444-45, 194 S.E.2d at 28.
32. 428 U.S. at 300.
33. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
34. Also decided were Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality
opinion). (In Roberts, the Court struck down a mandatory death penalty statute.
The statutes in Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek, which gave varying degrees of discretion to juries in capital cases, were upheld).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss2/8
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lina's mandatory death sentence constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 5 According to the United States Supreme Court, under
contemporary standards of decency, death is viewed as an inappropriate punishment for a substantial portion of convicted first degree murderers.3 6 Mandatory death sentences are consequently inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments'
requirement that the State's power to punish be "exercised within
the limits of civilized standards.

'87

The Court held further that in

capital cases the "fundamental respect for humanity underlying
the Eighth Amendment

.

.

requires consideration of the charac-

ter and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensible part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death."'
In response to Woodson, the General Assembly enacted N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-2000 to 2003, effective June 1, 1977.'0 These
death penalty statutes provide for a separate sentencing proceeding upon conviction of a capital felony."4 The jury is required to
render a sentence recommendation based upon (1) whether enumerated aggravating circumstances exist, and (2) whether any enumerated mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 1 When the jury recommends a sentence of
death, the foreman must sign a writing on behalf of the jury which
shows (1) the statutory aggravating circumstances which the jury
finds beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) that the statutory aggravating
circumstances are sufficiently substantial to call for the death penalty, and (3) that the mitigating circumstances are insufficient to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances (hereinafter referred to as
the "subsection (c) issues").' 2
The trial courts initially construed the death penalty statutes
to mean that if the jury answered the three subsection (c) issues
affirmatively it could, but was not required, to recommend the
35. 428 U.S. at 305.
36. Id. at 295-96.
37. Id. at 288 (citing
opinion).
38. Id. at 304.
39. See supra note 8.
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. §

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality

15A-2000(a)(1) (Cum.Supp. 1981).
15A-2000(b) (Cum.Supp. 1981).
15A-2000(c) (Cum.Supp. 1981).
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death penalty."3 The First Pattern Jury Instruction promulgated
after the statute provided that if the jury answered the three subsection (c) issues affirmatively then it "may recommend the death
penalty."44 A subsequent revision emphasized the point by providing that the jury "may, although it need not, recommend that the
45
defendant be sentenced to death.
As a consequence of the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Goodman, 6 the Pattern Jury Instruction was
changed to provide that if the jury affirmatively answered the subsection (c) issues, it would be its "duty to recommend that the defendant be sentenced to death. ' 47 The issue in Goodman was
whether the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that it
might recommend a sentence of life imprisonment even though it
found the aggravating circumstances outweighed those in mitigation.48 Upholding the trial judge's ruling, the court rejected defendant's contention that otherwise the jury would mathematically
balance the two types of factors and impose the death penalty
whenever aggravating factors outnumbered those in mitigation. 49
The court viewed the proposed instruction as informing the jury
that it could disregard the procedures outlined in N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-2000.5 0 However, the court did not expressly hold that the jury
must recommend death whenever it answers the subsection (c) issues affirmatively.
ANALYSIS

In conformity with the revised Pattern Jury Instructions, the
jury in Pinch was advised that if its answered this subsection (c)
issues affirmatively, it had a duty to recommend the death penalty.51 The majority, in an opinion by Justice Copeland, held that
the jury was correctly informed that it had a duty to recommend a
sentence of death if it made the three findings necessary to sup43. 306 N.C. at 42, 292 S.E.2d at 232.
44. Id. (citing N.C.P.I. Crim. 150.10 p.5 (June 1977)).
45. Id. (citing N.C.P.I. Crim. 150.10 p.4 (Replacement, May 1979)).
46. 298 N.C. at 34, 257 S.E.2d at 590.
47. 306 N.C. at 43, 292 S.E.2d at 233 (citing N.C.P.I. Crim. 150.10 pp.3-4
(Replacement, May 1980)).
48. 298 N.C. at 34, 257 S.E.2d at 590.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 590.
51. 306 N.C. at 32-33, 292 S.E.2d at 226-227.
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port such a sentence under G.S. § 15A-2000. 52 According to the
majority, the jury "had no such option to exercise unbridled discretion and return a sentencing verdict wholly inconsistent with
the findings it made pursuant to G.S. § 15A-2000(c)." 3 A jury may
not "arbitrarily impose or reject a sentence of death," but "may
only exercise guided discretion in making the underlying findings
required for a recommendation of the death penalty.

.

.(emphasis

original)." 5' The majority considered Goodman as implicitly answering the defendant's contention that the instruction was
improper.5

Justice Exum, dissenting as to sentence, found himself in
strong disagreement with the majority as to the proper construction to be given G.S. § 15A-2000. To Justice Exum, the statute is
designed simply to insure that certain specific (subsection (c)) prerequisites are met before the death penalty is imposed."
Its only prerequisites for the imposition of life imprisonment are
that the jury base such a decision (subsection (b)) on a weighing
against each other of various aggravating and mitigating circumstances which it may find to exist. Although the jury may not
recommend death without specifically, and in writing, answering
subsection (c) issues
affirmatively, even if it does so it may yet
57
recommend life.

Justice Exum supported this interpretation through analysis
of G.S. § 15A-2000. Subsection (b) provides that the jury "must
consider" any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and render
a sentence recommendation "based upon" these circumstances. 8
Subsection (c) provides that only "when the jury recommends a
sentence of death" must it answer the three subsection (c) issues
affirmatively and in writing.59 This statutory scheme, Justice Exum
believed, evidenced a clear legislative intent to "strike a balance
between fairness to the individual defendant and consistency
among the cases in which the death penalty is imposed, 0 and "to
avoid the extremes of mandatory death penalties or unbridled dis52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

34, 292 S.E.2d at 227.
33, 292 S.E.2d at 227.
33-34, 292 S.E.2d at 227.
46, 292 S.E.2d at 234.
40, 292 S.E.2d at 231.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 40-41, 292 S.E.2d at 231.
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cretionary action by juries."'" Nothing in this scheme, maintained
Justice Exum, suggested a legislative intent to require the jury to
return a death sentence even if it should answer the subsection (c)
issues affirmatively. 62 Subsection (b) only requires that the jury's
recommendation be "based upon" consideration of aggravating and
mitigating factors, "not decreed by them."63 It was illogical to hold
that, if affirmative answers to the subsection (c) issues are prerequisite to a jury's recommendation of death, then death must be
recommended whenever the prerequisites are met.6 4
Goodman did not support the holding of the majority, according to Justice Exum. The defendant was arguing, in effect, that the
court should explain to the jury that it could ignore the consideration which the statute says it must consider in recommending a life
or death sentence. 65 Such an instruction "goes far beyond the...
instruction actually given . . . in Goodman, that if the jury answered the three subsection (c) issues affirmatively and unanimously, it 'may then recommend the death penalty.'
The majority's interpretation of G.S. § 15A-2000 apparently
was based on the fear that otherwise the statute would be subject
to constitutional attack that, as in Furman, the jury could decide
between life and death in its unbridled discretion.67 In Justice
Exum's view, however, permitting the jury to recommend a life
sentence even though the subsection (c) issues were answered affirmatively is not the type of arbitrary determination found wanting in Furman.68 In support of this proposition he cited the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Bullington v.
7
Missouri69 and Gregg v. Georgia.
Bullington involved the interpretation of a Missouri death
penalty statute7 1 very similar to G.S. § 15A-2000. In that case the
Court noted that the jury "is instructed that it is not compelled to
impose the death penalty, even if it decides that a sufficient aggra61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 41, 292 S.E.2d at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 43, 292 S.E.2d at 233.
Id. at 43-44, 292 S.E.2d at 233.
Id. at 33-34, 38, 292 S.E.2d at 227, 230.
Id. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at 230.
451 U.S. 430 (1981).
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.006 (1978).
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vating circumstance or circumstances exist and that it or they are
not outweighed by any mitigating circumstance or circumstances. ' 72 Justice Exum pointed out that, although the question
was not raised, there was no suggestion that such a statute would
be unconstitutional. 3
In Gregg, the Court considered a Georgia death penalty stat7
ute which provided that the jury could return a death sentence
only if it found the existence of one or more specified aggravating
circumstances, but could recommend mercy without finding the existence of mitigating factors. The defendant argued on appeal that
the statute violated Furman. The Court saw this contention as a
misinterpretation of Furman, saying that "the isolated decision of
a jury to afford mercy does not render unconstitutional death
sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced under a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice. 1 7 5 Answering the defendant's contention that other discretionary decisions7 s involved in prosecution of murder cases unfairly
resulted in some candidates for the death penalty escaping it, the
Court said, "Nothing in any of our cases suggest that the decision
to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the
77
Constitution."
These decisions, argued Justice Exum, clearly indicated that
the majority's interpretation is not constitutionally required.78
Analysis of G.S. § 15A-2000 strongly supports the interpretation advanced by Justice Exum. Although subsection (b) requires
the jury to consider aggravating and mitigating factors and to base
it recommendation on these factors 7 9 nowhere does the statute
provide that the jury must return a recommendation of death if it
answers the three subsection (c) issues affirmatively. If the jury
72. 451 U.S. at 434-35.
73. 306 N.C. at 46, 292 S.E.2d at 235. (In Buflington, the defendant was
given life imprisonment at the penalty phase, and later gained a retrial on the
issue of guilt. The Court held that because the sentencing proceeding at the first
trial was like the trial on the question of guilt, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented a retrial of the penalty phase.)
74. GA. CODE § 27-2534.1 (1976).
75. 428 U.S. at 203.
76. E.g. the jury's option to convict of a lesser included offense; the prosecutor's authority to plea bargain; and the fact that the Governor may commute the
death sentence.
77. 428 U.S. at 199.
78. 306 N.C. at 46, 292 S.E.2d at 234.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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has considered aggravating and mitigating factors, its action is not
arbitrary merely because it answers the subsection (c) issues but
nonetheless recommends life imprisonment. The jury has simply
decided that, after careful consideration of all relevant factors, the
death penalty could be imposed, but it instead will afford mercy to
the defendant.
The emphasis in G.S. § 15A-2000 is upon insuring that no defendant be sentenced to death unless the jury has (1) carefully
considered all relevant circumstances and (2) found that the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by those in mitigation.
The language of the statute does not suggest an attempt by the
General Assembly to insure that a defendant will be sentenced to
death whenever the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed. Because G.S. § 15A-2000 does not create a "substantial risk
of arbitrariness or caprice ' ' 0 in the imposition of the death penalty, the "isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy,"8' 1 as permitted under Justice Exum's interpretation, is free of constitutional
difficulty.
The majority maintains that the jury may not "arbitrarily or
capriciously impose or reject a sentence of death (emphasis original). 82 Clearly, neither the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Furman, nor the plain language of G.S. § 15A-2000 permit the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. However, Bullington and Gregg strongly suggest that a statute which permits arbitrary rejection of the death penalty is not unconstitutional under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The statute upheld in
Gregg, for example, did not permit imposition of the death penalty
unless the jury found the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances, but the jury could recommend mercy regardless of the
number and severity of the aggravating circumstances found to exist. Moreover, G.S. § 15A-2000 is not such a statute, because the
jury must consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
base its decision upon them.
The respective roles of the trial judge and the North Carolina
Supreme Court in imposition and review of the death sentence
provide additional support for Justice Exum's interpretation of
80. 428 U.S. at 203.
81. 451 U.S. at 434-35; 306 N.C. at 46, 292 S.E.2d at 235; GA.
2534.1 (1976).
82. 306 N.C. at 33, 292 S.E.2d at 227.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss2/8

CODE

527-

12

1983]

Young: Criminal Law - Death Penalty: Jury Discretion Bridled
JURY DISCRETION

463

G.S. § 15A-2000. G.S. § 15A-2002 83 provides that the judge "shall"
impose the sentences recommended by the jury. G.S. § 15A-2000
(d) (2)8 requires the North Carolina Supreme Court to overturn
the death sentence if the jury's findings are not supported by the
record or are disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases. Finally, G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(3) s5 provides that if the sentence
of death is reversed on appeal, a new sentencing hearing shall be
ordered. The foregoing provisions indicate that the trial judge
must impose the sentence recommended by the jury, and the
North Carolina Supreme Court is limited to reviewing sentence
recommendations of death. Absent is any statutory provision for
review of sentences of life imprisonment. Consequently, both the
trial judge and the North Carolina Supreme Court are bound by
the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, regardless of the
jury's findings on the subsection (c) issues." It appears incongruous to instruct the jury that it is required to recommend the death
penalty if it answers the subsection (c) issues affirmatively, because
if it fails to do so the North Carolina Supreme Court is powerless
to correct the error.
An argument can be made that the majority's interpretation of
G.S. §§ 15A-2000 to 2003 to require recommendation of the death
penalty if the jury answers the subsection (c) issues affirmatively in
effect creates a mandatory death sentence. However, if so it is not
the type of mandatory death sentence invalidated in Woodson, because the sentence would impose only after "consideration of the
character and record '87 of the defendant and the "circumstances of
the particular offense."8'1 The North Carolina statute in Woodson
was struck down because these factors were not considered. The
majority's interpretation of G.S. § 15A-2000 is probably constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, but appears
inconsistent with the language of the statute, and the jury should
83. See supra note 8.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The court conceded the point in State v. Williams, where it noted that in
several cases the jury had indeed recommended life imprisonment after answering
the subsection (c) issues affirmatively, and that this "issue was error favorable to
the defendant from which the State could not appeal." 305 N.C. at 689, 292
S.E.2d at 263. See State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 259 S.E.2d 502 (1979); State v.
King, 301 N.C. 186, 270 S.E.2d 98 (1980).
87. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
88. Id.
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not be instructed that, if it answers the subsection (c) issues affirmatively, it then becomes its duty to recommend a sentence of
death.
What will be the actual impact of the instruction approved in
Pinch on the decisions of juries in sentencing proceedings? Jurors
may well interpret "duty" in its moral sense rather than as expressing an actual requirement that they return a recommendation of
death if they answer the subsection (c) issues affirmatively.
Whether a jury will actually recommend a sentence of death when,
for perhaps inarticulable reasons, it strongly feels the defendant
should be sentenced to life imprisonment appears doubtful. Of
course, the jury can always circumvent the majority's interpretation by answering one or more of the subsection (c) issues negatively, regardless of its actual findings on the subsection (c) issues.
CONCLUSION

In holding that the jury was correctly advised that it had the
duty to recommend a sentence of death if it found (1) that one or
more statutory aggravating circumstances existed; (2) that the aggravating circumstances were substantial enough to warrant the
death penalty; and (3) that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt,
the Pinch majority adopts an interpretation of G.S. § 15A-2000
which is difficult to support. The majority, rather than engaging in
a careful analysis of the statute, simply relied in Goodman. Unfortunately, Goodman did not involve the precise issue of concern in
Pinch, and the decision in Goodman itself is at least questionable.
If the intent of the General Assembly was in fact to require
the imposition of the death penalty whenever the subsection (c)
issues are answered affirmatively, modification of G.S. § 15A-2000
to insure that result is relatively simple. The jury should be instructed that if all three subsection (c) issues are answered affirmatively, the court shall sentence the defendant to death, but if one
or more subsection (c) issues are answered negatively, then the
court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. The jury
would make written findings on the subsection (c) issues and submit these findings to the trial judge, who would then impose the
appropriate sentence. In other words, the jury's role would be limited to making the underlying findings required in subsection (c),
and would not include making the sentence recommendation. This
procedure would make it impossible for the jury to answer the subhttp://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss2/8
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section (c) issues affirmatively without the death penalty being
imposed.
J. Craig Young
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